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Abstract—Communication and information field has witnessed
recent developments in wireless technologies. Among such emerg-
ing technologies, the Internet of Things (IoT) is gaining a lot of
popularity and attention in almost every field. IoT devices have
to be equipped with cognitive capabilities to enhance spectrum
utilization by sensing and learning the surrounding environment.
IoT network is susceptible to the various jamming attacks
which interrupt users communication. In this paper, two systems
(Single and Bank-Parallel) have been proposed to implement
a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) Model to detect jammer
in Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) sub-
carriers modulated with different M-QAM. The comparison of
the two systems has been evaluated by simulation results after
analyzing the effect of the self-organizing map’s (SOM) size on
the performance of M-QAM modulation.
Index Terms—Cognitive Radio, IoT, OFDM, Dynamic Bayesian
Network, Kalman Filter, Particle Filter.
I. INTRODUCTION
A new paradigm in the information and communication
field known as IoT connects a wide variety of ubiquitous
objects [1]. IoT is shaping real-world assets by providing
unique features to remain interconnected with anything at
any place and time by using any available network [2]. It
has been advocated to deploy wireless technology to connect
objects in IoT. However, this gives rise to the problem of
spectrum scarcity as many devices intend to utilize spectrum
in order to remain connected. Hence, technological trends are
shifting to integrate Cognitive Radio (CR) into IoT. CR is an
emanating technology which has been developed to eradicate
the spectrum scarcity problem [3]. Devices in IoT must
be equipped with the cognitive capabilities to refrain from
insufficient utilization of spectrum [4]. CR is an intelligent
system that can sense, learn and adapt to the environmental
modifications by regulating optimally its operating parame-
ters based on the observation and previous experience. For
CR to achieve the required aforementioned objectives, the
physical layer needs to be highly flexible and adaptable. To
this purpose, OFDM has been recognized as an attractive
transmission modulation technique for CR systems. In OFDM,
all the elements of the time-frequency grid can be scanned
without any extra hardware by exploiting the Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT), which simplifies the sensing process of the
operating spectrum. Furthermore, OFDM can be adapted to
different transmission environments by simply changing some
parameters as FFT size, modulation and transmission power,
achieving good adaptation and scalability. Moreover, since
OFDM modulation is successfully implemented in various
technologies such as Wireless Local Area Network (LAN)
standards (IEEE 802.11a, 11g, 11n, 11ac, 11ad, 11ah) and
Long Term Evolution (LTE), it will be easy for CR employ-
ing OFDM to inter-operate with such technologies [5]. CR-
IoT network suffers from various kind of malicious attacks.
Such kind of attacks aims to disrupt communication, deplete
the bandwidth and seize transmission. Therefore, to achieve
CR-IoT network objectives, providing secure communication
under jamming attacks is a basic yet challenging task [6].
Several methods have been studied and proposed to detect
jammer attacks in CR-IoT network. These include signature
based method, anomaly based detection and classification. In
this perspective, anomaly-based detection method has been
studied and proposed to detect malicious attacks by using
machine learning techniques [7]. In [8] deep auto-endcoders
are deployed to identify abnormal signals in wireless spectrum
whereas, machine learning based anomaly detection method
is formulated in [9]. In [10] jammer attacks in CR-IoT
network are addressed by using channel assignment technique.
For practical IoT systems, machine learning based security
techniques are explored and discussed in detail [11]. In [12],
benefits of implementing OFDM modulation in IoT network
are highlighted. In CR, it is imperative to learn legitimate and
non-legitimate user’s behaviors to make inferences about their
states inside the spectrum by exploiting statistical properties
[13]. In this way, we can better predict user’s activities in the
spectrum as time evolves. Furthermore, jammer’s behavior can
also be exploited in a much more vivid way.
This paper is motivated by previous work on detecting jammer
[14]. Nonetheless, this paper differs from previous work since
i) It focus on investigating multiple sub-carriers modulated
with different M-ary QAM in the OFDM signal under jammer
attacks in the CR-IoT network. The general objective while
considering multiple sub-carriers is to track the jammers
behavior and analyze how it is jumping between different sub-
carriers, to detect the attacked frequency and predict what will
be the next sub-carrier that the jammer might attack in the next
time instant. ii) Jammer detection is achieved by implementing
two proposed systems Single and Bank-Parallel DBN. iii)
Analyze the performance of the learned models (Single and
Bank-Parallel) in an unsupervised way in order to understand
the difference between the two systems and evaluate the
experimental results. Additionally, effect of changing SOM
size in relation with QAM modulation is analyzed and results
are shown.
The proposed DBN realizes a Probabilistic Switching Model
(PSM) which provides an agility to draw inference for each
time slice about the spectrum at discrete and continuous levels
by employing a combination of Particle Filter (PF) for discrete
level and Kalman Filter (KF) for the continuous level. The
combined approach is called as Markov Jump Particle Filter
(MJPF), was first presented in [15] for different sensory data
abnormality detection. A test set is used to evaluate the signal
which is affected by a jamming interference and both proposed
methods are capable to detect jammer attack.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes related work. Sections III and IV present the system
model and the proposed method, respectively. Experimental
results are discussed in section V. In section VI, conclusion
and future work are highlighted.
II. RELATED WORK
CR-IoT network is vulnerable to the various jamming
attacks. Consequently, the performance of the network declines
and eventually becomes the worst under devastating attacks. In
this paper, probabilistic model based jammer detection method
is presented. In [16], authors formulate a novel encryption
scheme employing OFDM for a system to combat various at-
tacks. In [17], authors present eavesdropping-resilient OFDM
system based on sub-carriers interleaving and allocation rely-
ing on channel state information. The joint time and power
allocation schemes are presented to improve security rate
of OFDM system against jamming attacks [18]. In [10], it
is highlighted that the anomaly-based approach is better to
detect jammer behavior and, various CR features such as
signal modulation, signal power, centre frequency, channel
bandwidth, carrier sense threshold and bit error rate, can
be used to evaluate the performance of the network under
normal operation. The signal strength (SS) and packet delivery
ratio (PDR) are exploited during the learning phase of the
network under no jamming attacks [19]. During the testing
phase, the jammer is accompanied by a normal signal and
detection is done by comparing jammer presence against the
baseline profile. In [20], authors proposed anomaly based
detection method which uses K-mean clustering for mobile
network. In [21], authors provided anomaly detection method
to countermeasure the effects of jammer in CR network.
In [22], jammer’s behaviour is learned by implementing Q-
learning algorithm. The work [21] involves many nodes in data
processing to perform anomaly behavior analysis. Therefore,
it is not well-suited for the CR-IoT network. Moreover, [22]
engages many tiny nodes in learning jammer behavior which
raises energy-constrained issues. Consequently, it can’t be
deployed in a CR-IoT network. In this work, we consider
two readily available features (amplitude and phase) of the
received OFDM signal and learn the DBN model, unlike
the work presented in [19] which relies on SS and PDR
and doesn’t provide practical implementation aspects of the
system. Moreover, it is shown that IoT devices use radio
channel bandwidth, channel gain and receive jammed power
to implement the Q-learning algorithm [11]. On the contrary,
we rely on two simple characteristics of the received signal by
taking an inherited advantage of the FFT module inside the
OFDM signal which gives amplitude and phase of the signal.
Hence, processing is much more convenient and well-suited
for CR-IoT network.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a CR-IoT network consisting of a group of
Cognitive Radio Users (CRUs) and a jammer trying to disrupt
the communication as shown in Fig. 1. CRUs sense the
spectrum continuously and try to detect abnormal situation.
The radio spectrum contains OFDM waveforms based on
IEEE 802.11ah standard, which is adopted in this work.
OFDM divides the band channel into many narrower sub-
carriers allowing different users to transmit simultaneously
with different orthogonal frequencies. The OFDM modulated
signal consists of a set of N sub-carriers:
C = {C1, C2, . . . , CN}, (1)
each sub-carrier is divided into Q symbols in time domain,
forming a N × Q time-frequency grid. In the previous work
[14] only one sub-carrier is picked to employ the proposed
method supposing that OFDM use 16-QAM for all the sub-
carriers in the set (1). Instead, here we consider multiple sub-
carriers modulated with different QAM (4, 16, 64, and 256-
QAM according to the standard IEEE 802.11ah). Exploiting
FFT output which consists of amplitude and phase of each
symbol makes the spectrum sensing easier and less complex
where CRUs can scan the entire grid. Moreover, by using
the Amplitude and Phase information at this level, permits
to implement a jammer detection technique before demodu-
lation of the signal which reduces the receiver complexity.
The jammer attacks at different time instants by jumping
from one frequency into another. We assume that there is a
perfect synchronization between the transmitter and receiver.
To evaluate the dynamics of the amplitudes and phases related
to consecutive symbols and how they are evolving with time
we consider the derivatives (ȧ, ṗ) of both amplitudes (a) and
phases (p), and the generalized state vector can be defined at
each time instant k for a specific sub-carrier as,
Xk,Cn = [ a p ȧ ṗ ] n = {1, 2, . . . , N}, Cn ∈ C (2)
A set of generalized state vectors corresponding to each sub-
carrier is defined as:
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Fig. 1: Spectrum of the M-ary QAM modulated OFDM users
in the CR-IoT Network under jammer attacks
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
The proposed method follows several processes that lead to
detect abnormality behaviours in the spectrum, including the
Offline Learning Process and the Online Testing Process. Two
systems have been proposed Single and Bank-Parallel to
deal with multiple sub-carriers where the Processes mentioned
previously are used in both systems to learn the DBN model
and obtain the abnormality indicator, respectively.
A. Offline Learning Process
The Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) model which is
shown in Fig.2 is learned after obtaining a set of state vectors
which describe signal behaviour in the spectrum under normal
situation (without jammer). DBN enables to include depen-
dencies between involved random variables as time evolves.
DBN facilitates the representation of different inference levels
related to the spectrum’s dynamics. Consequently, here the
lowest level of inference corresponds to measurements Zk
related to the observed received carriers in terms of amplitude
and phase. States of the spectrum, Xk, represent a medium
inference level which encodes continuous information of the
spectrum. Super-states Sk corresponds to the top level of
inference, which consists of the discretization of continu-
ous information. Additionally, arrows represent conditional
probabilities between the involved variables. Vertical arrows
facilitate to describe causalities between both, continuous
and discrete levels of inference and observed measurements.
Horizontal arrows explain temporal causalities between hidden
variables.
In order to learn the super-states, we employed a SOM that
use as input the states of the spectrum and produce a set of
super-states S including similar information (quasi-constant
derivatives),
S = {S1, S2, . . . , SL}, (4)
where Sk ∈ S and L is the total number of superstates. A
temporal transition matrix can be estimated by observing the
activated superstate over time and encode the probabilities
P (Sk|Sk−1, tk) of moving from a current superstate to an-
other one (Sk), considering the time tk spent in the current
superstate (Sk−1). Each super-state is characterized by a mean
value and covariance matrix.
To analyze and make inferences about a dynamic system,
two models are required: the measurement model that maps
observation into states and the dynamic model that describes
the evolution of the state with time, and it can be written as:
Xk = AXk−1 +BUSk−1 + wk, (5)
where Sk is the previous obtained region, A = [A1 A2] is
a dynamic model matrix: A1 = [I2 02,2]ᵀ and A2 = 04,2.
In represents a square identity matrix of size n and 0l,m is a
l×m null matrix. B = [I2∆k I2]ᵀ is a control input model.
wk represents the prediction noise. The variable USk−1 is a
control vector that encodes the spectrum’s action when it is
inside a superstate Sk, such that:
USk = [ȧSk ṗSk ]
ᵀ, (6)
Accordingly, it is possible to estimate the probability of
obtaining a future spectrum’s state given its present state









Fig. 2: Proposed DBN model to detect jammer in the Spectrum
B. Online Testing Process
To infer and detect the jammer, we proposed to use the
MJPF introduced in Section I. As mentioned before, the
MJPF uses Particle filter to make inferences at discrete levels.
Additionally, each considered particle employs a Kalman
Filter corresponding to the dynamic model learned for the
corresponding value of the superstate (Eq.5) at the continuous
level. As abnormal measurement we use the db1 defined in
[15].
C. Single Dynamic Bayesian Network
As shown in the figure 3, we use the set of state vectors
corresponding to each sub-carrier in (Eq.3) to learn a single
DBN. During the Offline Learning Process, X is considered
as input of the SOM which outputs a set of neuron S. In this
approach S consists of the discretization of the entire spec-
trum. However, single DBN keeps a memory of the spectrum’s
behaviour in time and frequency domain. Additionally, a single




Fig. 3: Single DBN system
D. Bank-Parallel Dynamic Bayesian Network
In this approach, we don’t have any correlation between
the sub-carries, where the spectrum’s behaviour at each sub-
carrier Xk,Cn is processed individually (Fig 4). Accordingly,
for each Xk,Cn we learn a DBN, such as:
DBN = {DBN1, DBN2, . . . , DBNN}, (7)
In the online process a MJPF is applied on each DBNn
providing an Abnormality signal, such as:

















Fig. 4: Bank-Parallel DBN system
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND RESULTS
A. Data Source
We use the OFDM system based on IEEE 802.11ah stan-
dard. We use a simulated OFDM signal consists of N = 64
sub-carriers and Q = 1000 symbols. The source generates
random independent data. Each sub-carrier of the OFDM
signal is modulated with different QAM modulation. For our
experiments, we pick four sub-carriers with different QAM
modulation (4, 16, 64, 256). The received signal is assumed
to be affected by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with
zero mean and power spectral density σ2w. Data is cleaved into
two data sets: first set contains clean data (without jammer
attacks) which is used during training phase and the second
one includes jammer’s attacks which is used during testing,
immediately after cyclic prefix (CP) is removed and FFT is
performed on received data. We consider that jammer launches
attacks into multiple sub-carriers with equal power.
B. Performance evaluation of M-ary QAM with SOM size
The performance of Single and Bank-Parallel DBN models
are evaluated under multiple attacks and results are shown in
terms of ROC curves which consist of Probability of Detection
(Pd) and Probability of False Alarm (Pf ), and Area Under
Curve (AUC). The abnormality measurement (db1) is used to
calculate the (Pd) and (Pf ) respectively. (Pd) is the the number
of times where abnormalities (related to jammer attacks) are
correctly identified, while (Pf ) are the times where anomalies
are wrongly assigned to normal symbols. Fig. 5 illustrates
the ROC curve obtained from Single DBN when a different
number of neurons is selected. It is evident from Fig. 5 and
Tab. I that 1024 neurons are the most appropriate for a Single
DBN. Whereas, Fig. 6a, 6b, 6c and 6d present Bank-Parallel
DBN ROC curves. For every ROC curve, each DBN deploys
different QAM and optimum SOM size is analyzed. In case
of 4-QAM, the optimum SOM size is 4 (see Fig. 6a and Tab.
II). In 16-QAM is 4 (refer Fig. 6b and Tab. II). For 64-QAM,
is 8 (see Fig. 6c and Tab. II), and for 256-QAM is 8 (refer
Fig. 6d and Tab. II). We believe that the optimum number
of neurons depend on the data and the number of symbols.
For the simulated data used in our experiments and from the
obtained results we can notice that the Bank-Parallel system
performs well for a small number of neurons, where the Single
system performs well for a large number of neurons. This
is due to the fact that Single-DBN use the generalized state
vector consisting a large number of samples (4Q symbols),
which is 4 times the number of symbols used in Bank-Parallel
system.
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Fig. 5: ROC for a Single-DBN under attacks while varying
SOM size
SOM size 4 16 64 128 256 512 1024
AUC (%) 98.95 99.75 99.05 99.89 99.71 99.93 99.95
TABLE I: Precision measurements for a Single-DBN
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Fig. 6: ROC for an individual DBN in Bank-Parallel-DBN
employs different M-QAM under attacks while varying SOM
size
SOM size





) 4-QAM 99.99 99.89 96.65 97.82 96.64 98.23 96.38
16-QAM 99.86 99.79 99.51 99.7 97.46 96.51 91.76
64-QAM 99.16 99.89 99.61 99.67 96.31 95.11 97.13
256-QAM 98.55 99.83 98.87 99.2 96.1 91.36 95.35
TABLE II: Precision measurements for a Bank-Parallel-DBN
C. Comparison between Single and Parallel DBN
After using the optimum number of neurons obtained pre-
viously to make a fair comparison between the two systems.
The performance of both systems is somehow similar as
shown in Fig. 7. We can deploy either of the proposed
method depending on the receiver complexity and specific
task. For instant, Single DBN learns single vocabulary for
all sub-carriers, whereas, Bank-Parallel DBN learns multiple
vocabularies corresponds to each sub-carrier which increases
complexity. Subsequently, implementing bank parallel DBN
is suitable for the source characterization tasks. Tracking the
jammer and keeping its profile history in the entire spectrum
is much more convenient in Single DBN.
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Fig. 7: Performance comparison between Single-DBN and
Bank-Parallel-DBN in terms of ROC
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we present a jammer detection method in mul-
tiple OFDM sub-carriers by using two different systems. Sub-
carriers are modulated with different M-QAM and optimum
SOM size is selected for each QAM modulation based on
the probability of detecting multiple attacks. As a conclusion
we have learned that using the two systems, Single DBN
and Bank-parallel DBN, exhibits similar performance under
multiple attacks. The results presented in this work provide
an understanding to further investigate the dynamic behaviour
of the jammer in order to track its activity inside the spectrum
and characterize it.
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